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Bland de mest centrala frågorna i gränsområdet mellan demografi och ekonomi är vilken 
påverkan storskaliga demografiska processer har på långsiktig ekonomisk utveckling. Den 
klassiska frågeställningen, som upptagit tänkare från Malthus fram till senare delen av 1900-
talet, var om snabb befolkningstillväxt hotade ekonomisk tillväxt. Denna klassiska frågeställning 
har nu ersatts av mer sofistikerade frågeställningar där fokus på aggregerad befolkningstillväxt 
har ersatts av fokusering på specifika befolkningsgruppers tillväxt. Disaggregering av 
befolkningstillväxtens effekter på åldersgrupper har generellt accepterats som en avgörande 
förbättring jämfört med en klassiska frågeställningen eftersom människors ekonomiska roller och 
bidrag varierar över ålder: . de unga är nettokonsumenter och mottagare av 
humankapitalinvesteringar, mogna vuxna är nettoproducenter och sparare, och de gamla är 
(åtminstone i teorin eller i högre grad än mogna vuxna) nettokonsumenter. Därför blir de 
ekonomiska konsekvenserna av snabb tillväxt i befolkningsstorleken av de unga och de äldre en 
potentiell dämpning av tillväxttakten medan en snabb tillväxt i den aktiva vuxenbefolkningen 
kan stimulera tillväxten. 
 
Den demografiska transitionen medför en trestegsprocess där en baby boom kohort rör sig 
genom befolkningens ålderspyramid. Denna kohorts livscykel skapar först ett stadium med snabb 
tillväxt i den unga befolkningen, därefter en period med snabba tillväxt i den aktiva 
vuxenbefolkningen och avslutas med ett stadium av snabb tillväxt i äldrebefolkningen. Den 
första och tredje perioden kan betraktas som ekonomiska utmaningar där man måste konfrontera 
frågan om hur man ska försörja en växande beroende befolkning. Däremot kan vi se det andra 
stadiet som en demografiska gåva eller avkastning eftersom den snabba tillväxten i aktiv 
befolkningen kan förstärka tillväxten i ekonomin. 
 
Den traditionella mekanismen för den demografiska avkastningend inkluderar baby boomens 
ökning av arbetsutbudet, sparandet och humankapitalet. Emellertid tyckks man i forskningen ha 
förbisett den potentilla påverkan på den teknologiska utvecklingen, vilket är ovanligt eftersom 
alla standardredogörelser för ekonomisk tillväxt håller före att på lång sikt är teknisk utveckling 
den enda källan för förbättringar i levnadsstandar. Demografisk påverkan på teknologin kan 
emellertid mycket väl överskugga betydelen av allting annat. 
 
Det finns tvåkonkurrerande hypoteser beträffande demografiska processer och teknisk 
utveckling. Den ena menar att snabbt växande vuxenbefolkningar stimulerar den tekniska 
utvecklingen medan den andra menar att det skulle bromsa teknikutvecklingen. Om vi analyserar 
makroekonomiska data från ländertvärsnitt under perioden 1970 till 2000 finner vi att baby boom 
kohorternas inträde i vuxenålder korrelerar med högre arbetsproduktivitet, även om man 
kontrollerar för kapitalbildning och tidigare produktivitet. Våra resultat stöder uppfattningen att 
den demografiska avkastningen även omfattar positiva effekter på den tekniska utvecklingen, 
vilket på lång sikt kan visa sig vara mycket viktigare än några de andra konsekvenserna av den 
demografiska avkastningen.  I. Summary 
 
Among the most central questions at the intersection of demography and economics is the impact 
of large scale demographic processes on long-run economic performance.  The classical version 
of this inquiry, occupying thinkers from Malthus towards those from the mid-to-late 20
th century, 
had to do with whether rapid population growth threatened economic growth.  This classical 
inquiry has been superseded by more sophisticated questioning in which the focus on growth rate 
of the aggregate population has been replaced by focus on the growth rates of age-specific 
population sub-groups.  Disaggregating the effects of population growth by age-group is 
generally accepted to be a fundamental improvement over classical inquiry because people’s 
economic roles and contributions vary by age: the young are net consumers and beneficiaries of 
human capital investments, adults are net producers and savers, and the old are (at least in theory 
or to a greater degree than adults) net consumers.  Thus the economic consequences of rapid 
growth in the population size of the young and the elderly could potentially have a depressing 
impact on growth, while rapid growth in the population size of adults could stimulate growth. 
 
The demographic transition brings with it a three stage process in which a baby boom cohort 
moves through the population’s age pyramid.  The life cycle of this cohort creates a first stage in 
which there is rapid growth in youth population, then a second stage in which there is rapid 
growth in the adult population, and finally a third stage in which there is rapid growth in the 
elderly population.  The first and third stages can be thought of as the challenging stages since 
economies must confront the challenge of providing for large dependent populations.  However, 
the second stage can be thought of as a demographic gift or dividend stage since growth in the 
productive adult population can potentially boost economic growth. 
 
The traditional mechanisms for the demographic dividend include the impact of the boom cohort 
on labor supply, savings, and human capital.  However, it seems to us that there has been no 
research on the potential impact of age structure on technological progress, which is unusual 
since all standard accounts of economic growth hold that in the long run, it is technological 
progress that is the sole source of improvement in living standards.  Demographic impacts on 
technology could well dwarf the importance of everything else. 
 
There are two competing hypotheses regarding demographic processes and technological 
progress. One holds that a rapidly growing adult population stimulates technological progress, 
while the other holds that it retards it.  Analyzing cross-country macro data from developing 
countries for the period 1970 to 2000, we find that entry of the baby boom cohort into the adult 
stage is correlated with higher labor productivity, even after controlling for capital accumulation 
and past productivity.  Our evidence supports the view that the demographic dividend includes 
positive impacts on technological progress, which may in the long-run prove more consequential 
than any other demographic dividend consequences. II. Introduction 
 
One of the most fundamental questions in the long history of thought in economics is the precise 
nature of the relationship between populations and development, in particular whether population 
growth was a threat or a facilitator of economic development.  There have been, since the 
seventeenth century, two schools of thought that have recently been called the “pessimistic” and 
“optimistic” view. 
 
The pessimistic view is perhaps the more resonant of these two views and received its most 
famous early statement from Malthus (1798) 
 
“Taking the population of the world at any number, a thousand millions, for instance...the human 
species would increase in the ratio of 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 516, etc. and subsistence as 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, etc.  In two centuries and a quarter the population would be to 
the means of subsistence as 512 to 10; in three centuries as 4096 to 13, and in two thousand years 
the difference would be incalculable.” 
 
Thus progress in food production is always threatened by population pressure.  And although 
agricultural innovations and discoveries of new resources may cause improvements in standards 
of living, these can only be temporary.  Rising prosperity sets in motion more rapid population 
growth, which drags living standards back to subsistence levels.  Malthusian pessimism has 
persisted through the subsequent two centuries, and lives to this day.  Some recent manifestations 
have been largely alarmist.  A famous such example is Ehrlich (1968) which predicted that “The 
battle...is over. In the 1970s hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death.”   
The later half of the 20
th century has proved alarmist versions of pessimism to be wrong.  At a 
global level, these have been periods of rapid population growth AND rapid economic growth.  
In the past few decades, world per capita incomes have increased by about 2/3rds and the world 
population has grown by over two billion (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003).  Famines have 
occurred but Ehrlich’s “hundreds of millions” of people have not starved. Technological 
progress, in both agriculture and industry, has been more rapid than at any other time in human 
history. There have been equally dramatic social and institutional innovations, in the ways 
people work, the standard of their education and health, and the extent to which they participate 
in the political process. Rather than being constrained by fixed resources, the world sees the 
prices of raw materials in long-term decline; inflation (for the moment at least) quite low; and 
some parts of the economy becoming ‘dematerialized’ as the knowledge revolution kicks in. 
While alarmist accounts seem largely and appropriately discredited, there remain more sober and 
carefully reasoned accounts of why large populations and high population growth pose 
challenges for development.  One focuses on the possible effect of population growth in 
“diluting” a society’s material resources, which have to be spread out over more people.  In the 
canonical Solow (1957) model of economic growth, which remains the foundation of the modern 
economics profession's view of the relationship between population growth and economic 
welfare, population growth lowers levels of per capita consumption because productive resources 
need to be spread out over a larger number of people, lowering each person’s stock of productive 
resources, and therefore that person’s product and well-being.  Another strand focuses on the 
possible effect of population growth in “diluting” a society’s human capital.  Larger population growth invariably occurs through growing numbers of dependent children that jeopardize 
society’s and households’ capacities to invest sufficiently in their nutrition, health, and education 
(Becker and Lewis 1973).  In both cases of dilution of physical and human capital, economic 
growth is threatened, and the likelihood of poverty rises. 
 
However while pessimism has centered around the idea that population “dilutes” either natural 
resources, physical capital, or human capital, a rival optimist view has focused on the potential 
positive impact that population growth might have on ideas, innovation, and technology.  
Optimism has an older and equally venerably lineage as pessimism.  As early as 1682, William 
Petty argued that larger populations meant more innovation 
 
“As for the Arts of Delight and Ornament, they are best promoted by the greatest number of 
emulators.  And it is more likely that one ingenious curious man may rather be found among 4 
million than 400 persons....And for the propagation and improvement of useful learning, the 
same may be said....(1682/1899, p. 474, quoted in Simon, 1981)” 
 
More recently, optimist views have been expressed by Simon Kuznets (1967) and Julian Simon 
(1981), who argue that population increases serve to augment the stock of human ingenuity, 
allow economies of scale.  Boserup (1981) argues that population growth creates pressures on 
resources, but thereby stimulate innovations to counteract these pressures. Thus innovation is 
borne of adversity. 
Much empirical research that has tried to investigate the evidence for and against the pessimist 
and optimist views has found that there seems relatively little compelling evidence for either 
view (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003).  While there is a raw empirical association between 
faster economic growth and slower growth in per capita income across countries, this association 
disappears once we control for country size, openness to trade, educational attainment, and the 
quality of civil and political institutions.  By the mid-1990s, Kelley and Schmidt (1995) describe 
the evidence as follows: 
“Possibly the most influential statistical finding that has shaped the “population debates” in 
recent decades is the failure, in more than a dozen studies using cross-country data, to unearth a 
statistically significant association between the growth rates of population and of per capita 
output.” 
 
Thus the data on cross-country experiences with population growth and economic growth 
provide no strong support for either pessimist or optimist views and has given rise to a third 
position, which might be called “population neutralism.” 
There seems to be lack of consistent empirical support for either of the grand but simple 
narratives relating population and growth.  However, these narratives have perhaps been too 
simple, in that they focus only on the impact of population size and growth, and too little focus 
on what could be a critical demographic variable, and that is age structure.  The most important 
population dynamics of the 20
th century occurred through the demographic transition, which, 
while having an impact on population growth rates, also have an impact on age structure which 
have only recently received heightened attention. The demographic transition consists of two stages: an initial decline in infant and child mortality 
followed by reductions in fertility.  This transition became a distinct feature of populations all 
over the world, both rich and poor, after World War II.  In the developing countries, the 
mortality reductions were spurred by developments in medicine and public health such as the use 
of antibiotics like penicillin, treatment for diseases like TB and diarrhea, the use of DDT for 
malaria control, and improved sanitation, hygiene, and nutrition.  While these reduced mortality 
risks throughout the population, they were especially effective at reducing infant and child 
mortality.   
 
The combination of falling mortality and steadily increasing fertility over a decade or more 
contributed to a spurt in population growth rates driven to a great extent by growth in the number 
of the young.  This phenomenon was widely referred to as the population explosion and 
perceived to be a central obstacle to development.  It was also this phenomenon that led to the 
resurgence of the population pessimism of Ehrlich and others, according to which population 
growth had a recurrent tendency to outstrip food supplies, and that balance between the two 
would only be achieved by widespread famine and starvation which brought them back into 
equilibrium, only to have the cycle repeat perhaps indefinitely.   
 
This pessimistic scenario did not come to pass.  Fertility declines from the 1960s onwards took 
the momentum out of population growth.   
 
The lag between the declines in mortality and fertility created a historically larger than average 
cohort of children or baby boom: because of increased fertility and survival rates, it was larger 
than the ones that preceded it, and because of the subsequent fertility decline, it was also larger 
than the ones that followed.  The coming into existence and aging of this cohort produced and 
continues to produce remarkable changes in the age structure of populations all over the world. 
 
The movement of this cohort through the population age structure is potentially very important.  
Although the early part of the demographic transition is characterized by higher population 
growth, this stage lasts only as long as it takes for fertility rates to decline in response to 
mortality rates.  This may last a generation.  However the baby boom generation will live for 
perhaps as much as 70 to 80 years, thus far outliving the population growth that accompanied its 
creation.  The impact of the cohort might therefore far outlast the impact of the population 
growth from earlier on in the transition. 
 
The baby boom generation confronts the economy with challenges and opportunities 
corresponding to the different stages of its lifecycle.  In its early stages, the economy faces the 
challenges of a high youth dependency.  These include the challenges and expenses of feeding, 
clothing, housing, and of investing in the health and education of the young.  Thus high youth 
dependency can result in lower human capital expenditures per child.  This might occur for the 
following reasons.  First, under some models of fertility determination, fertility may fail to 
respond optimally to declining mortality rates, making realized fertility higher than desired 
fertility.  In the presence of credit constraints, this causes an unplanned reduction in household 
resources and human capital expenditures per child.  Second, even when fertility is able to 
respond optimally to declining mortality rates, lower child mortality rates lower the cost of a 
surviving child.  This can cause a substitution effect away from child quality towards child quantity.  Third, models of endogenous fertility and human capital choices usually allow for 
multiple equilibria, one of which is characterized by low fertility and high child quality, and the 
other by high fertility and low child quality.  Which equilibrium occurs depends on history and 
expectations.  The demographic transition causes a general growth in youth dependency that can 
support the choice of the latter equilibrium.   
 
This higher youth dependency can also reduce savings.  The traditional mechanism is given by 
Coale and Hoover (1958) who hypothesize that higher youth dependency can depress savings 
and therefore economic growth since households must devote larger shares of household income 
and resources to children.  Savings may also be reduced for a second reason, and that is because 
children are a source of retirement support.  Thus if parents have more children, they may feel 
less need to save for retirement, and therefore save less.  One must balance these, however, 
against some theoretical reasons whereby having more children might raise savings (Deaton and 
Paxson 2000): having more children may raise parental needs to save to provide bequests for 
their children and grandchildren, or to have resources that can be used to ensure good behavior 
among descendents (sometimes called the “strategic bequest” motive).   
 
Fry and Mason (1982) have also argued that demographic effects on savings can interact with 
economic growth.  Economic growth tends to make younger households wealthier than older 
households so that the behavior of younger households is more consequential for national 
aggregates than that of older households.  Thus when economic growth is high, the savings 
behavior of younger households is what matters.  If these younger households are saving less 
because they have more children, then national savings is more likely to fall as well. 
 
However, when the baby boom cohort becomes adult, a second stage occurs in which this cohort 
can provide a boost to economic development through its impact on labor supply, savings, and 
human capital.  This large working age cohort affects labor supply in two ways.  
 
Firstly, there is an accounting effect.  Labor force participation rates are highest during the ages 
of 15 and 64, so that a larger population share in this age group raises labor supply.  Second is a 
behavioral effect.  Since women in this cohort will have lower fertility rates, they will have fewer 
children and will be more likely to enter the labor force.   
 
This cohort’s effect on savings can likewise be decomposed into an accounting and behavioral 
effect. Working age adults tend to save a higher proportion of their income than either the youth 
or the elderly.  This is a prediction of both life cycle models of consumption and empirical study 
of the savings behavior of adults of different ages (Higgins, 1998; Higgins and Williamson, 
1997; Kelley and Schmidt, 1996; Lee, Mason, and Miller, 2000; Leff, 1969; Mason, 1988; Webb 
and Zia, 1990).  Thus a larger population share of adults mechanically increases savings.  A 
behavioral response towards increased savings can occur for a few reasons.  First, as households 
decrease in size due to lower fertility, then the traditional Coale and Hoover (1958) hypothesis 
implies that households can save larger fractions of their income.  However, this may be 
counteracted by increased expenditures per child (Becker and Lewis 1973).  Second, since these 
cohorts experience longer life expectancies, they need to save more to provide for a potentially 
longer retirement (Metzler 1992).  Third, according to the Fry and Mason (1982) mechanism, if economic growth is high, then the increased savings of younger households is a strong driver of 
increased national savings.   
 
Finally, there are effects on human capital.  The baby boom generation has lower fertility, and 
therefore smaller households, which allows households to invest more intensively in each child, 
reflecting a movement from a demand for child quantity towards quality (Becker and Lewis 
1973). 
 
And when this cohort reaches old age, society is confronted with the need to provide for the 
health and pension needs of the elderly.  The developed countries, whose baby boom generations 
are retiring, are already facing these challenges. 
 
A final hypothesis—the central research question of this paper--has to do with the possible 
relationship between age structure and technological progress.  While there have been pioneering 
contributions examining this issue, many of them have focused on the wealthy nations (Cutler, 
et. al. 1991, Malmberg et. al. 2005, Lindh and Malmberg 1999, Malmberg 1994), with only one 
studying the situation in developing countries (Kogel 2005).  It is possible that while this 
hypothesis has received relatively less attention from researchers interested in age structure 
changes, this may be the most important with respect to long term economic development.  
Standard models of economic growth (see Romer 1996) all argue that sustained long-term 
growth in standards of living have only one source:  productivity growth.  If age structure 
changes have significant effects on productivity, these may in the very long run, outstrip all its 
other consequences in economic significance.  For example, it is often argued that population 
aging and fertility reductions the world over will soon result in large old-age dependent 
populations supported by much smaller working age cohorts.  This rise in the dependency ratio is 
often taken to mean that these smaller working cohorts will have to bear the very heavy burden 
of contributing their own income to provide old-age security.  This may be counteracted partially 
by the fact that labor force participation rates, especially for women, are rising over time, so a 
given working age population size will, over time, represent more and more active workers on 
whom elderly populations can depend on for support.  But more importantly if, as one hypothesis 
goes, technological progress is stimulated when labor is scarce, then the technological progress 
that accompanies the shrinking working age population could more than compensate for the 
increased dependency burden.  Thus the direction in which changes in the size of working-age 
cohorts affects productivity is a central question. 
 
Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner, and Summers (1991) review the arguments.  According to one view, 
exemplified by Simon (1981) and Wattenberg (1987), large young cohorts increase the supply of 
creative thinkers and potential innovators.  They also constitute a larger market of consumers 
that allows for—pace Adam Smith—greater division of labor, larger markets for capital goods, 
and greater opportunities for realizing economies of scale.  These views echo the centuries’ old 
view of Petty (1682) and the more recent view of Kuznets (1967) described earlier.  The upshot 
of these arguments is that large adult cohorts will stimulate technological progress.  An 
additional mechanism leverages the traditional demographic dividend hypothesis that adult-rich 
populations have higher savings rates with traditional endogenous growth model arguments 
(Romer 1996) whereby higher savings rates reduce interest rates which in turn stimulate 
investments and R and D expenditures, which in turn raise TFP.  Yet another mechanism, suggested by Thomas Lindh in personal communication, might work through a cohort crowding 
effect whereby labor market congestion among larger young adult cohorts may sway young 
adults away from the labor market towards more schooling, resulting in a better educated 
population, which in turn is better able to generate innovation. 
 
According to the opposing view, exemplified by Habakkuk (1962), innovations are more likely 
to emerge when labor is scarce and innovations are required to relax these constraints.  It is when 
particular segments of the labor market are constrained that innovations are likely to come that 
save on labor requirements.  Thus industrialization occurred faster in the US than in England 
because the profitability of US agriculture made American labor significantly more expensive 
than in England, stimulating industrial innovation to economize on its use.  Habakkuk’s view 
parallels that of Boserup (1981) who also argues that technological innovation is borne of 
adversity.  The Habakkuk/Boserup view would lead us to suppose that an abundance of 
productive adults would dampen the stimulus to innovate, so that rapid growth in the adult 
population would be associated with slower technological progress.  Thus we have two 
hypotheses, the first of which (Simon/Kuznets/Petty) implies that growth in the adult population 
should stimulate technological progress, and the second (Habakkuk/Boserup) says that it should 
slow it down. 
 
There has been remarkably little work done on the question of age structure and technological 
progress.  The exceptions to this are Romer (1990) and Cutler, Poterba, Sheiner, and Summers 
(1990) who both find evidence in the US and in the developed countries suggesting that the 
relationship is actually negative.  That is, the argument put forward by Habakkuk/Boserup seems 
to be right.  Labor productivity tends to grow fastest when adult cohort sizes shrink.  In fact, 
Cutler et. al. find that the productivity growth caused by shrinking working age cohorts in the US 
is more than sufficient to negate the decline in living standards caused by the old-age 
dependency burden.  If this result generalizes to the developing countries, the alarm with which 
demographers and economists react to the prospect of population aging and growing elderly 
dependency ratios is misplaced. 
 
III. Regression specification 
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We do not have data on capital stocks, but can re-express the production function in terms of 
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and assuming that depreciation is δ , and that in the long-run, the growth rate of the capital stock 
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Allowing for country and period fixed effects and an error term gives  
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ln  term is subsumed in the country fixed effect, countries are indexed by c 
and periods by t.  Differencing out this fixed effect gives  
 
() ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ln ln − − − − − − − + − + − − + − + − = − ct ct t t ct ct ct ct ct ct ct ct v v E E i i A A y y ε ε ρ α α  
 To model changes in TFP, we make the ad hoc assumption that: 
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where the first equation allows changes in TFP to be a function of initial TFP and change in the 
age structure (which is the regression specification used by Kogel 2005), while the second 
equation follows simply by using   as a proxy for  .  Substituting the second equation 
into the difference equation gives: 
1 − t y 1 ln − t A
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Thus we can regress changes in log labor force productivity on lagged log productivity, change 
in age structure, change in logged investment per worker, and a constant representing the 
differenced period effect.  A test of the reasonableness of the specification is the value of the 
parameter α which should equal the coefficient of capital in the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, usually thought to be around 1/3.  This specification is similar to that used by Cutler et. 
al. (1990) (specifically their equation 18) with the exception that we use the change in logged 
investment per worker in our specification while they use the average investment rate   over 
the period t-1 to t. 
Y I /
 
Theory does not give us strong guidance as to the theoretically appropriate measure of age 
structure and so we use four different measures of age structure: population median age, the 
working-age share of the population, the size of the workforce, the size of the working-age 
population (aged 15-64). 
 
IV. Data and analysis 
 
We construct a panel dataset of economic and demographic variables observed for the 
developing countries during the period 1970 to 2000.  We limit ourselves to the 66 developing 
countries with national populations of at least 1 million people in the year 2000 and complete 
data on the variables for the years 1970 to 2000.  These countries are listed in Appendix 1.  Our 
sources of data are the Penn World Tables version 6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2006) from 
which we obtain measures of output per worker (rgdpwok), investment per worker (which equals 
the product of the investment share of output variable ki multiplied by the output per worker 
variable rgdpwok), and the working population (which equals the population variable pop 
multiplied by the per capita output variable rgdpch divided by the output per worker variable 
rgdpwok), the World Population Prospects 2006 Revision dataset (United Nations Population 
Division 2006) from which we obtain population median ages and the proportion of the 
population of adult age, and the Cohen and Soto (2001) data on educational attainment from 
which we obtain the variable ty1564 which measures total years of schooling among the 
population aged 15 to 64. 
 Our regression specification requires data from two time periods t and t-1, which we take to be 
the years 2000 and 1970 respectively.  We do not use periods prior to 1970 because of the higher 
frequency of missing data for these periods.  Summary statistics of the data are in Table 1, 
below: 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable  Year Obs Mean  Std.Dev. Min  Max 
Output/worker 1970 66  8447  7225  922  26861 
Output/worker 2000 66  11501  10492  1328  58750 
Inv/worker 1970  66  131475  173110  2308  1017744 
Inv/worker 2000  66  180352  327697  5063  2364501 
Years  school 1970  66 3.1  2.0  0.1  7.5 
Years  school 2000  66 5.9  2.6  1.0  12.3 
Median age  1970  66  18.4  2.9  15.4  30.9 
Median age  2000  66  21.9  5.0  15.2  34.7 
WorkPop  (000) 1970 66  15647  59201  252  423000 
WorkPop  (000) 2000 66  30460  106281  502  755338 
Adult  share  1970  66  0.53 0.04 0.47 0.65 
Adult  share  2000  66  0.58 0.06 0.48 0.72 
AdultPop(000) 1970 66  19305  67693  318  464831 
AdultPop(000) 2000 66  39539  130357  665  866450 
 
 
Regressions results are contained in table 2.  Each of the four columns uses a different age 
structure variable.  The first column uses the median age, the second uses the adult share of the 
population, the third uses the working population, and the fourth uses the working-age 
population.  Note that the age structure variable is statistically significant at the 1% level when 
the median age or adult population share is used.  It is significant at the 5% when the working 
population is used, and significant at the 10% level when the adult population is used.  Note also 
that the coefficient on the investment per worker variable is everywhere a little below 0.3, which 
is the level one would expect from a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
 Table 2.Regression results for Specification 1.  Dependent variable is    1970 2000 y y −
Dependent variable is    1970 2000 y y −
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(6.97e-07)** 







y  is output per worker 
i is investment per worker 
E is years of schooling 
1 as  is median age 
2 as  is the adult share of the population 
3 as  is the working population 
4 as  is the working-age population 
 
The last row of this table, labeled elasticity, shows the percentage change in the annual growth 
rate of labor productivity per percentage change in the age structure variable in the year 2000.  It 
is readily seen that the elasticities of labor productivity with respect to median age and the adult 
share of the population are very large, while the “scale effects” of the size of the working 
population and working-age population are rather more modest.  The results all broadly support 
the view that the entry of the baby boom cohort into the adult years has a positive impact on 
productivity.  All of the age structure coefficients are positive, and the vast majority of them are 
statistically significant.  This implies that none of our regressions support the finding of Cutler 
et. al. (1990) or the theoretical arguments of Habbakuk (1962) that scarcity of working age adults 
provokes technological innovation.  Rather, our results support the general tenor of demographic 
dividend type arguments, which argue that emergence into adulthood of the baby boom cohort 
tend to have economic effects that are conducive to growth (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003).  
The results support the views of Simon (1981) and Wattenburg (1987) that larger adult cohorts 
are more productive ones.  
V. Discussion 
 
We find evidence of a correlation between the demographic dividend stage of the demographic 
transition with productivity.  This suggests that further research on the technological 
consequences of demographic change would be fruitful.  This new avenue of research could be 
especially useful since the empirical evidence for the impact of the demographic transition on 
macroeconomic variables, which mostly focuses on the relationship between age structure and 
savings, remains mixed.  Some argue that age structure effects on savings are large: Leff (1969) 
found that the log of gross savings rates was inversely associated with population shares under 
15 and older than 64, controlling for log per capita income and its growth over the previous five 
years.  Bloom and Canning (1999) calculate that the demographic dividend accounts for about 
1/3 of the rapid per capita income growth experienced by East Asia.  Mason (2001) calculates 
that up to one-fourth of this growth is due to demography.  Lee, Mason, and Miller (2001) 
perform simulations that imply that demography caused about half of a 20 percentage point 
increase in East Asian savings. 
 
However, not everyone finds the evidence so compelling.  For example, Schultz (2004) argues 
that a careful re-estimation of data from East Asia show that the association between age 
structure and savings is only one fourth that reported in Higgins and Williamson (1997), that 
careful specification eliminates any dependence of savings on age structure.  Thus while the 
empirical work regarding age structure impacts on savings remains ambiguous, empirical work 
that tests the other two traditional mechanisms, the impact of age structure on human capital 
accumulation and labor supply, remains to our knowledge, non-existent.   
 
Thus it remains credible to argue, as Schultz (2004) does, that the empirical case for a positive 
impact of the adult rich stage of the demographic transition remains to be made.  It is our hope 
that our results stimulate interest in yet another mechanism whereby demographic change can 
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